A surprising contact on LinkedIn. A proposal of work from a headhunter, probably a young woman, operating from the Asian nation. The chance to make around £20,000 on the side writing a handful of political reports for a firm from China containing “non-public” or privileged information. Payment in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It may seem clear, in this scenario, that something about this approach would be suspicious. Nevertheless, China’s influential intelligence agency still considers it valuable to deploy recruitment consultants to attempt this – leading MI5 to warn repeatedly about their activity online.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented scale, at a rate of ten thousand over the previous 30-month period, seeking political, industrial, defense and technological secrets. But a new initiative targeting elected officials and Westminster has led the intelligence service to act again.
An espionage alert was distributed on this week via the administrative teams of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, peers, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anybody who might provide information.
Intelligence Strategy and Legal Changes
In the curious style of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from the agency or the interior ministry. Yet the service was aware its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the press helps the general population more easily recognize communications with a deceptive purpose.
The alert has the effect of uncovering additional details from in and around Westminster, although that is not MI5’s main objective. The service aims for public figures to understand that simply because exchanges on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Additionally, the domestic spy agency understood to have been reacting to any specific incident in parliament, although the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing collapse of the prosecution of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his associate Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
Both individuals had been accused of working for China – a charge they denied – but failure to complete a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Updated Legislation and China's Long-Term Goals
Legislation has since been updated, and the security briefing includes a note of its successor: “Those engaging in spying operations risk substantial criminal penalties under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a crime if a person engages in conduct that could potentially “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious inquiry, however, is what China has to achieve. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is also interested in parliament: for a period, in recent years, the Britain's China policy on matters such as the telecom firm or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
To a degree there are distinct approaches as well. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's utilize information gathering techniques and the size of its spy network is vast, employing 300,000 people. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “China have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
Beijing is willing to cultivate contacts over the extended period and sometimes even the agencies have struggled to differentiate genuine connections and spying. “China has a low threshold for what information is considered to be of value,” security minister a government official told MPs on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean an individual rapidly peripheral turning significant.
Another way to consider the relentless activities at covert information gathering is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between Beijing and the Western nations at a threshold below the point of direct conflict. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the one campaign penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of millions connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is involved in persistent efforts to find secret informants on British democracy online because it seeks to be provocative, to demonstrate power and because it can.
